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INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Amidst a global pandemic, President Donald Trump removed five inspectors general 
within the federal government, including the inspector general in charge of overseeing the 
coronavirus response efforts in health agencies and the inspector general directly involved with 
the whistleblower complaint that led to Trump’s impeachment.1 The President’s unprecedented 
actions against government oversight officials calls attention to an otherwise little-noticed 
institution and signals a growing need for accountability in government on all levels.2 
Established by the Inspector General Act of 1978, federal inspectors general provide 
oversight within the executive branch by detecting and investigating potential fraud, waste, and 
abuse.3 Federal inspectors general are internal watchdogs of seventy-three federal agencies that 
answer directly to the head of their respective agency, who has the power to restrict or reduce 
investigative access of the inspector general.4 Because these inspector generals must also report to 
Congress, however, executive branch agencies and the president have an incentive to limit the 
abilities of an inspector general, or in the present case, remove them from office when it is 
politically advantageous.5 This is especially problematic for an agency created to restore public 
trust in government. Alternatively, a number of states  led by Massachusetts in 1980   have 
                                                          
1 McCarthy, B. (2020, May 19). Trump has pushed out 5 inspectors general since April. Here’s who they are. 
PolitiFact. https://www.politifact.com/article/2020/may/19/trump-has-pushed-out-5-inspectors-general-april-he/  
2 Sinnar, S. (2013). Protecting rights from within? Inspectors general and national security oversight. Stanford Law 
Review, 65(5), 1027-1086. 
3 Inspector General Act of 1978, Publ. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978). 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1101.pdf#page=1  
4 Balutis, A.P., & Upson, D. (2017, July 19). Independence, accountability and the Office of Inspector General. 
Federal Computer Week. https://fcw.com/articles/2017/07/19/pointcounterpoint-igs-balutis-upson.aspx  
5 Pacifico, N. (2016, September 09). Independence of inspectors general is essential. Project on Government 
Oversight. https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2016/09/independence-of-inspectors-general-is-essential/  
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an Inspector General's Office with statewide jurisdiction.6 In contrast to the federal model, these 
state inspector general offices, though part of the executive branch, operate independently and 
answer only to the legislature and a separate independent council.7 Given the need for honest 
government in the recovery from the ongoing ramifications of the pandemic, it is timely and 
beneficial to examine the current institutional design of federal Inspectors General in comparison 
to those on the state level.  
 Independence is critical to the success of an inspector general in the performance of their 
statutory duties. Those duties are compromised, however, when the authority that oversees the 
inspector general removes them from office due to political or self-serving motivations. In light of 
President Trump's unprecedented actions, changes to the institutional structure of federal 
inspectors general should look to the states, such as Massachusetts, where the inspector general is 
more insulated from politics and may not be removed unilaterally.8 In Part I, the history, general 
structure, and key characteristics of federal inspectors general are examined. Part II explores the 
history and structure of the Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General, as well as key 
characteristics. Finally, Part III discusses the importance of institutional independence to 
inspectors general in the context of President Trump's removals and argues potential reforms to 
prevent future actions on the federal level.  
I. FEDERAL INSPECTORS GENERAL OFFICES 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
                                                          
6 Zisman, P. (2013, March/April). The people’s watchdog. Capitol Ideas, 56(2), 38-39.  
7 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.12A, § 1-15 (2020). 
8 Id. § 2.  
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 Social Security fraud was so pervasive in the 1970s that store fronts would open with a 
sign reading "come in for free coffee and join the Medicaid operation."9 After a series of various 
scandals in Federal programs in the 1970s, several Congressional hearings exposed fraud and 
waste in executive agencies.10 These hearings discovered that a number of departments had serious 
deficiencies in resources and procedures used for the prevention of fraud and abuse.11 Many lacked 
organizational structures for internal audits and investigations entirely, with some reporting to a 
number of various officials as opposed to one singular official.12 For example, the Department of 
Transportation had one hundred and sixteen separate units with no main leadership.13 Some had 
no auditory or investigative units at all.14 Furthermore, many lacked resources necessary to run 
extensive internal audits. At the time, the internal audit cycles often lasted ten to twenty years, 
depending on the agency.15 Moreover, almost without exception, auditors and investigators 
reported to the very officials that had responsibility for the programs subject to audit or 
investigation.16 Generally, federal agencies lacked affirmative programs that looked for possible 
fraud and abuse and instead relied on complaints.17 
These environments allowed fraud and waste in federal expenditure programs within 
agencies to run unchecked. As a result, Congress held a series of subcommittee hearings tasked 
with finding deficiencies in agencies and how to remedy them. In particular, the House 
                                                          
9 Establishment of an Office of Inspector General in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: Hearing on 
H.R. 5302 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov't 
Operations, 94th Cong. 14 (1976) (statement of Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Member, H.R.).  
10 Office of the Inspector General, The Inspector General Act: 40 Years Later, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://oig.ssa.gov/newsroom/blog/oct11-ig-act-anniversary.  
11 H.R. REP. NO. 95-584, at 4 (1977). 
12 H.R. REP. NO. 95-584 at 5. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 H.R. REP. NO. 95-584 at 6. 
16 H.R. REP. NO. 95-584 at 5. 
17 Id. 
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Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources investigated the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare and found wide-ranging deficiencies in detecting fraud and 
abuse.18 With program expenditures at the time of over $118.5 billion, the department could 
attribute as much as $3 billion in annual losses due to waste or fraud in Medicare and Medicaid, 
as well as an additional $750 million annually to cases of fraud alone.19 Further, the Social Security 
Administration reported $27 million in annual losses due to doctors, hospitals, and nursing homes 
overcharging for Medicare.20 Federal student loan programs also reported a much higher rate of 
default than similar state or consumer loan programs.21  
The Subcommittee's investigation concluded that the Department had no effective 
centralized investigatory office with the authority to monitor its disbursements.22 As a practice, the 
federal government abdicated investigatory responsibilities for many programs to the individual 
states, but failed to ensure that each department had the resources necessary to oversee whether 
the states were actively investigating allegations of fraudulent or wasteful expenditures.23 Thus, 
enormous amounts of money were lost because of program mismanagement and abuse. First, 
investigative resources were severely inadequate.24 The central unit had only ten investigators and 
had a case backlog of over ten years.25 This was not unique, however, to the Department of Health, 
                                                          
18 Establishment of an Office of Inspector General in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: Hearing 
on H.R. 5302 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov't  
Operations, 94th Cong. 14 (1976). Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was divided into the Department 
of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services in 1979. 
19 Establishment of an Office of Inspector General in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 94th Cong. 






25 Id. at 9. 
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Education, and Welfare. The Department of Labor and the Small Business Administration reported 
having only one-third of the audit manpower they 
needed to be effective, and the Department of Veteran's Affairs reported having only one-fifth.26 
Second, departments did not have effective organizational structures. Units responsible for 
combatting fraud and abuse were scattered throughout the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare with no pattern or organization and had no single unit having the overall responsibility or 
authority needed to effectively lead.27 Furthermore, auditors and investigators at many departments 
reported to different officials rather than a single, centralized reporting figure.28 Similarly, the 
Rockefeller Commission on C.I.A. Activities criticized the C.I.A. for having such a small staff that 
individual program administrators were responsible for not only running programs, but also 
ensuring they were managed properly.29 As a result, information needed for action against fraud 
and abuse was either extremely difficult to obtain or simply not available.30 
Third, the personnel of audit and investigatory units within departments lacked the 
independence necessary to produce honest and thorough reports concerning serious problems 
within the respective department.31 Most of the unit personnel were hired and fired by the officials 
directly responsible for the programs being investigated.32 Consequently, many units opted not to 
make reports out of fear that the results may embarrass their own boss, which would subsequently 
                                                          
26 H.R. REP. NO. 95-584 at 7. 
27 Establishment of an Office of Inspector General in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: Hearing 
on H.R. 5302 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov't 
Operations, 94th Cong. 1 (1976) (statement of L.H. Fountain, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Intergovernmental 
Relations and Human Res.). 
28 H.R. REP. NO. 95-584 at 5. 
29 Establishment of an Office of Inspector General in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 94th Cong. 
at 10 (statement of Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Member, H.R.). 
30 Establishment of an Office of Inspector General in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 94th Cong. 
at 1 (statement of L.H. Fountain, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Res.). 
31 Id. at 2. 
32 Id. 
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lead to their termination.33 In addition, even when problems were made known, corrective action 
would often not be made until years later.34 At the C.I.A., audit and investigatory units could only 
conduct their reviews within the confines of material the C.I.A. Director chose to provide, which 
made reviews of illegal activity and abuse ineffective.35 Therefore, waste and fraud in various 
federal programs remained unchecked and millions of needy and deserving citizens were deprived 
of billions of dollars per year in intended support.36 
At the conclusion of the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and Human 
Resources' investigation, Congress noted the need for a centralized auditory and investigatory 
office to effectively control fraud, waste, or inefficiency in program expenditures of executive 
agencies. Their report noted that in every instance where an Inspector General's Office was 
established, it was considered an integral part of the economic efficiency of the agency in which 
it served.37 Necessary for that success, however, was a larger, more qualified staff with complete 
access to all information relevant to its reviews, and the authority to provide reports directly to 
outside bodies.38 Following hearings on the Subcommittee's report, Congress passed the Inspector 
General Act of 1978 creating an Office of the Inspector General in twelve executive agencies to 
conduct oversight and promote program integrity.39 
                                                          
33 Id. 
34 Establishment of an Office of Inspector General in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 94th Cong. 
at 2 (statement of L.H. Fountain, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Res.). 
35 Establishment of an Office of Inspector General in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 94th Cong. 
at 10 (statement of Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Member, H.R.). The C.I.A. Director was implicated by the Rockefeller 
Commission for participating in illegal activities. The Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and Human 
Resources noted the conclusion of the Rockefeller Commission that many of the C.I.A.'s illegal activities could have 
been avoided had their investigative unit been equipped with the authority to alert sources other than the Director of 
the improprieties festering within the agency. This conclusion helped support the case for a more independent 
Inspector General within executive agencies.  
36 Establishment of an Office of Inspector General in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 94th Cong. 
at 9 (statement of Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Member, H.R.). 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
39 5 U.S.C. app., Inspector General's Act (1978); Inspector General's Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 
(1978); see Establishment of an Office of Inspector General in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
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B. GENERAL STRUCTURE 
The Inspector General Act of 1978 created independent and objective inspectors general 
in twelve federal agencies to combat fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and operations of the 
respective agency.40 Each inspector general is responsible for conducting audits and investigations 
related to the programs and operations of their respective agency to promote efficiency and 
effectiveness in preventing and detecting fraud and abuse in those programs and operations.41 Each 
Inspector General's Office has a broad statutory mandate to fulfill their duties, allowing them to 
access all records available to their agency and may request information or assistance from other 
federal agencies.42 In addition to investigating fraud, waste, and abuse, each inspector general is 
tasked with identifying vulnerabilities within their agency and to recommend systemic changes to 
strengthen controls or mitigate risks.43 Moreover, they must keep their agency head abreast of their 
findings, thus requiring direct and prompt access to the agency head when necessary.44 Further, 
each inspector general is required to provide Congress with a semiannual report of their findings.45 
The Inspector General Act of 1978 has been amended several times since its enactment. 
Currently, there are seventy-two federal statutory inspectors general across the federal 
                                                          
94th Cong. at 10 (statement of Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Member, H.R.); Office of the Inspector General, The 
Inspector General Act: 40 Years Later, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Oct. 11, 2018). Offices of the Inspector General were 
established in the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Labor, 
and Transportation, and within the Community Services Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space  
Administration, the Small Business Administration, and the Veterans' Administration. An Office of the Inspector 
General was previously established in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1976, soon after the 
hearing of the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources' report. See Pub. L. No. 94-505, 
90 Stat. 2429 (1976).  
40 Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, The Inspectors General, at 1 (July 14, 2014), 
https://ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/IG_Authorities_Paper_-_Final_6-11-14.pdf.   
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 9, 12. 
43 Id. at 9. 
44 Id. at 5. 
45 Id. 
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government.46 Further, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized twenty-four Inspectors 
General Offices to exercise law enforcement authority, including carrying firearms, making  
arrests, and executing warrants.47 Additionally, the Whistleblower Protection and Enhancement 
Act of 2012 established the position of a whistleblower protection ombudsman responsible for 
educating employees about prohibitions on retaliation for protected disclosures and the remedies 
against any such retaliation.48 
Furthermore, a fundamental distinction separates the two types of inspectors general under 
the Inspector General Act of 1978.49 Establishment inspectors general are those that are appointed 
by the President of the United States with Senate confirmation.50 Designated federal entity 
inspectors general are those that are appointed by the agency head, board, or commission.51 With 
a small number of exceptions, both establishment and designated federal entity inspectors general 
share the same authority and responsibilities.52 
C. KEY CHARACTERISTICS 
Tasked with promoting economy and effectiveness of programs and operations of federal 
agencies, as well as detecting and preventing fraud, waste, and abuse within those agencies, federal 
                                                          
46 Id. at 1. 
47 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 296, 116 Stat. 2135, Title VII(B), § 812 (2002); see Council of the 
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, IG Act History, https://ignet.gov/content/ig-act-history (last visited 
Dec. 21, 2020). 
48 Whistleblower Protection and Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465, Title 1, § 117 
(2012); see Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, IG Act History, 
https://ignet.gov/content/ig-act-history (last visited Dec. 21, 2020). 
49 Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, The Inspectors General, at 2 (July 14, 2014). Other 
Inspector General Offices have been established through statutes other than the Inspector General Act of 1978. For 
example, the Architect of the Capitol (2 U.S.C. § 1808); Office of the Intelligence Community (50 U.S.C. § 3033); 
and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (National Defense Authorization Act for FY 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1229(b) (Jan. 28, 2008)); and the U.S. Capitol Police (2 U.S.C. § 1909), among others. 
50 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a). 
51 Id. § 8G(c); see Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376, Title IX(I), §§ 989(B-D) (2010).   
52 Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, The Inspectors General, at 2. 
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inspectors general rely on four key abilities: Independence, subpoena power, accountability, and 
reporting duties. First, independence of the inspector general ensures the objectivity of its work 
and protects it from efforts to compromise or hinder its operations.53 The inspector general's 
independence directly stems from its selection, appointment, and removal procedures. All 
inspectors general are required to be selected without regard to political affiliation and must be 
selected on the merits of their integrity and ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, 
management, investigations, and public administration.54 As stated above, Establishment 
inspectors general are appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, and designated federal 
entity inspectors generals are appointed by the head of their respective agency, be they an 
individual, board, or committee.55 As for removal, the Inspector General Act provided procedural 
safeguards against inspectors general being removed for political reasons or because they are 
effective at performing their duties.56 For both establishment and designated federal entity 
inspectors general, congressional notification letters must be sent by the President or agency head, 
respectively, to both chambers of Congress.57 Said notification letters must be sent to Congress at 
least thirty days prior to removal and must detail the reasons for removal.58 
In addition to the appointment and removal procedures and requirements, the independence 
of inspectors general is further enhanced by the prohibition of agency management officials from 
supervising the inspector general.59 Moreover, the agency head and other management officials 
                                                          
53 See Id. at 1. 
54 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 3(a); 8G(c).  
55 Id. 
56 Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, The Inspectors General, at 3. 
57 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 3(b); 8G(e).  
58 Id. [I would like to explore the consequences of whether Congress accepts the reasons or not, or whether they 
have a say in the matter at all, aside from just being informed]. 
59 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 3(a); 8G(d); see Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, The Inspectors 
General, at 4. Each Inspector General is under the general supervision of their respective agency head. In U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., the 4th Circuit Court held that "general supervision" 
equated to nominal supervisory authority. 25 F.3d 229, 235 (4th Cir. 1994). 
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are prohibited from preventing or denying the inspector general from initiating, carrying out, or 
completing any audit or investigation.60 This prohibition has its limitations, however. For seven 
agencies – the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury; as well as the 
Federal Reserve Board, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Postal Service – the 
agency-heads may prevent their respective inspector general for specific purposes, such as 
preserving a national interest, protecting the identity of undercover sources, or limiting the 
disclosure of information which may influence the economy.61 
Second, the broad authority of federal inspectors general to access all information 
necessary for its audits and investigations is critical to the effective performance of its statutory 
duties.62 This access includes any confidential information of the agency.63 Further, each inspector 
general may coordinate with other federal agencies and can request information or assistance.64 
The Agency head is required to provide that information or assistance insofar as it is practical and 
not in violation of any legal restriction.65 If an agency employee refuses to provide information or 
testimony, the inspector general must report the refusal to the agency head and include it in its 
semiannual report to Congress.66 Most importantly, inspectors general have the authority to issue 
subpoenas for the production of documents, records, or any information necessary in its audits or 
                                                          
60 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 3(a); 8G(d). 
61 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 8; 8(D); 8(E); 8(I); Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, The Inspectors 
General, at 4. 
62 5 U.S.C. app. § 6. [Need to explore reasons for enactment of the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016].  
63 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(a)(1); S. REP. NO. 95-1071, at 33-34 (1978); see also supra note 53 (although provided access, 
the Inspectors General from the listed seven agencies may be preventing from using or releasing such information 
for specific reasons listed in the statute). 
64 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(c). 
65 Id. 
66 see 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(a)(5); Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, The Inspectors 
General, at 11-12. 
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investigations.67 These subpoenas are enforceable by order of any appropriate United States district 
court.68 To assist in the performance of these broad access abilities, establishment inspectors 
general and particular employees are authorized by the Attorney General to exercise law 
enforcement powers.69 These powers include carrying firearms, make arrests without a warrant for 
any federal offense committed in their presence, and to seek and execute warrants for arrest, search 
of a premises, or seizure of evidence upon probable cause.70 
Third, federal inspectors general are obligated to keep both the head of the respective 
agency and Congress fully informed about deficiencies and progress in correcting those 
deficiencies in agency programs and operations.71 Each federal inspector general must issue 
semiannual reports to Congress detailing significant issues identified by the office, 
recommendations related to those issues, summaries of its prosecutorial referrals, as well as any 
disagreements with agency management or staff.72 The inspector general must first transmit their 
report to their agency head before delivering it to Congress.73 The agency head has thirty days to 
prepare a companion report commenting on the inspector general's findings and submit both 
reports to Congress.74 These reports are made available to the public upon request.75 
                                                          
67 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(a)(4). [The Ward Commission noted that the Inspector General Act of 1978 did not include the 
power to subpoena testimony. It is unclear from the statutory language whether that is true or not. I plan to explore 
this further.] 
68 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(a)(4). 
69 5 U.S.C. § 6(f)(1), (3); see Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, The Inspectors General, 
at 10. Designated federal entity Inspectors General may also exercise law enforcement authorities, but only upon a 
determination of eligibility by the Attorney General. The determining factors of eligibility are whether the office is 
significantly hampered in the performance of its responsibilities without such powers, whether available assistance 
from other law enforcement is inadequate, and whether the office has adequate safeguards in place to ensure proper 
exercise of the powers. 5 U.S.C. § 6(f)(2). 
70 5 U.S.C. § 6(f)(1)(A-C). 
71 5 U.S.C. § 4(a)(5).  
72 5 U.S.C. § 5(a). 
73 5 U.S.C. § 5(b). The reports must be submitted to the agency head no later than April 30 and October 31 of each 
year. 
74 5 U.S.C. § 5(b). 
75 5 U.S.C. § 5(c). At a reasonable cost. 
This is a white paper and has not yet been published, but is the copyright of the author.
Phipps Inspectors General and the Importance of Independence 12
Fourth, federal inspectors general have several mechanisms for accountability. Among 
them, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency is the unified council of 
all statutory inspectors general that addresses the integrity, economy, and effectiveness issues 
experienced by all agencies.76 Furthermore, the Council develops standards and policies for each 
office and assists in professional training for employees of the inspectors general.77 Additionally, 
the Council serves as an independent reviewer and investigator as to allegations of misconduct 
against the inspector general or their employees.78 Further, inspector general offices are required 
to comply with generally accepted government auditing standards established by the Comptroller 
General in the conducting of its audits.79 Moreover, the inspector general is kept accountable 
through public scrutiny by releasing all of their reports on their mandated websites.80 
II. MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In the Spring of 1975, amidst a federal investigation into corruption in Pennsylvania, a 
representative from the construction-management firm McKee, Berger, and Mansueto, Inc. 
responded to a question before a grand jury of whether he was aware of similar corruption 
occurring in any other state. His response: Massachusetts.81 This testimony was directly forwarded 
to the Boston field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.82 Thus launched an investigation 
into the Bureau of Building Construction's award of a multi-million-dollar contract to McKee, 
                                                          
76 Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-409, 122 Stat. 4302 (2008); see Council of the Inspectors 
General on Integrity and Efficiency, IG Act History. 
77 Id. 
78 5 U.S.C. § 11(d)(1)(4). 
79 5 U.S.C. § 4(b)(1); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Inspectors General: Independence Principles and 
Considerations for Reform, (June 8, 2020), at 1, https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/707412.pdf.  
80 5 U.S.C. § 8M(b)(1). Excluding reports containing classified or otherwise prohibited information.  
81 David Farrell, Two Senators on Trial: A Long, Twisting Tale of Politics, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 20, 1977, at A1, A4.  
82 Id. at A4. 
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Berger, and Mansueto, Inc. for the construction of the University of Massachusetts – Boston 
campus and buildings.83 
Aided by former Governor of Massachusetts Endicott Peabody as their attorney, the firm 
successfully bid for the contract in early 1971, ensuring a profit of one-and-a-half percent of $150 
million.84 A local state politics reporter at the time characterized the contract as a "sweetheart deal" 
that indicated little negotiation and possible collusion between the firm and the Bureau of Building 
Construction, within the Office of Administration and Finance.85 In response to the allegation, the 
state legislature filed an order to form a joint committee to investigate the awarding of the contract 
and those involved.86 The committee, headed by Senator Joseph DiCarlo, a potential opponent of 
Secretary of Administration and Finance Donald Dwight in the upcoming gubernatorial election, 
set out with the purpose of placing blame on Secretary Dwight.87 In a series of private meetings 
after the first round of committee hearings, Senator DiCarlo offered a favorable reporting for 
McKee in return for a payment of $30,000 to $40,000.88 The special committee report concluded 
that the contract was in no way illegal and there existed no possibility where the firm could 
unilaterally reward itself.89 By the time of the federal investigation in 1975, the company received 
close to six million dollars in profit.90 
At the conclusion of the investigation, Senator DiCarlo and another were indicted and later 
found guilty of violating the Hobbs Act, which prohibits extortion by public officials, and the 
                                                          
83 Id. at A1. 
84 Id. at A4. 
85 Id. at A1, A4. 
86 Id. at A4. 
87 William F. Doherty, Sen. Kelly Named Co-Conspirator in Extortion Case, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1977, at pg. 1, 9. 
88 Id. at pg. 9. 
89 Farrell, supra note 1, at A4. 
90 Id. 
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Travel Act, which prohibits interstate travel for illegal purposes.91 Three years later, the legislature 
ordered the creation of the Special Commission Concerning State and County Buildings to 
investigate the awarding of architectural and construction contracts in Massachusetts over the 
previous twenty years.92 
Chaired by John W. Ward, the former president of Amherst College, the Special 
Commission issued a twelve-volume report on public corruption in state and county buildings.93 
The commission found billions of dollars of waste in building projects and concluded that 
corruption was a way of life in Massachusetts.94 Moreover, the commission uncovered shoddy 
work and low standards in construction.95 For example, the library at Salem State College96 was 
structurally unable to support itself and the weight of books, furniture, and students.97 Further, the 
façade of the "World's Tallest Library" at the University of Massachusetts – Amherst was so 
unsecure that it rendered the building unusable just eight years after its construction.98 In addition, 
the Worcester County Jail had several defects such that its use was impractical, including a failing 
automatic cell-lock system.99 Perhaps the most striking, the campus of the University of 
Massachusetts – Boston, the very project that lead to the commission, had a multitude of structural 
                                                          
91 William F. Doherty, DiCarlo, MacKenzie Convicted on All 8 Counts of Corruption, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 26, 1977, 
at pg. 1, 3. 
92 Michael Knight, Massachusetts Told of Wide Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1981, § 1, at 1. 
93 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, History of the Massachusetts OIG: About John William Ward and the "Ward 
Commission," MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/history-of-the-massachusetts-oig#about-john-william-
ward-and-the-%E2%80%9Cward-commission%E2%80%9D- (last visited Nov. 10, 2020). 
94 Id. (Political influence, not professional performance, was the main condition for receiving state business).  
95 Id. 
96 Now Salem State University. 
97 SPECIAL COMM'N CONCERNING ST. & CTY. BLDGS., FINAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL COURT (WARD COMM'N) 
(1980), Vol. VI at 43-46. 
98 Id. at 66. 
99 Id. at 134. 
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defects and hazards that required several more millions of dollars to be spent to make the buildings 
usable.100 
Principal among its findings, however, was the need for a state office whose sole 
responsibility was to investigate and address problems within state government.101 More 
specifically, the Commonwealth needed a separate state agency tasked with the duty to prevent 
and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in the expenditure of public tax dollars.102 The functions of 
prevention and program review were not, at the time, traditional roles of prosecutors on the state 
or local levels.103 As a result, the Commonwealth could not conduct comprehensive investigations 
into fraud or abuse in its programs, nor did it have the staff and resources available to make the 
type of analysis that would reveal the existence of any fraud.104 Therefore, fraudulent practices 
such as those uncovered by the Commission could flourish unchecked, thus increasing the cost of 
public programs.105 
Moreover, both the state auditor and prosecutors, federal, state, and local, lacked the 
authority and review capabilities needed for the task of detecting and preventing fraud.106 First, the 
State Auditor could not launch a full-scale investigation into allegations of fraud in expenditures. 
It was limited to a review of documents within the state's own files and could only make 
determinations as to whether expenditures complied with the appropriate statutes, regulations, and 
standards and procedures of accounting and auditing.107 Second, prosecutors could investigate only 
                                                          
100 Id. at 97-104. 
101 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 13, Creation of the OIG. 
102 SPECIAL COMM'N CONCERNING ST. & CTY. BLDGS., FINAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL COURT (WARD COMM'N) 




106 Id. at 87.  
107 Id. 
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specific instances of fraud and corruption and were limited by the scope of the allegations and 
issues in a particular case.108 Further, prosecutors lacked the power and expertise in white-collar 
crime and political corruption to conduct wide-ranging, systemic investigations into particular 
projects or programs.109 Third, the Attorney General's Office did not have their own investigative 
staff to routinely develop the evidence needed to criminally prosecute procurement fraud.110 Nor 
did it have necessary resources devoted to making recommendations for systemic reform to reduce 
the recurrence of criminal activity.111 Lastly, the prosecution of singular instances of procurement 
fraud could not deter future acts of corruption. Instead, preventing the corruption that occurred 
prior to the Commission required correcting the practices and procedures of state agencies on an 
on-going basis.112 
B. GENERAL STRUCTURE 
 The Ward Commission, therefore, recommended an institutional mechanism to regularly 
review government contracts awarded within Massachusetts.113 The agency needed familiarity 
with the contracts awards process, including standard procedures and involved actors, and 
knowledge about financial transfers and corporate operations.114 Modeled after the Inspector 
General Act of 1978, the Ward Commission suggested an office on the state level that would 
conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to state programs and operations, provide 
leadership and coordination by recommending policies that promote economic efficiency, and 
detect and prevent fraud and abuse in those programs and operations.115 Furthermore, the office 
                                                          
108 Id. 
109 Id.  




114 Id. at 87, 88. 
115 Id. at 89.  
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would provide valuable guidance to the executive branch and legislature relating to problems and 
deficiencies in the administration of programs, viable corrective actions to those problems, and 
report on the progress of those solutions.116 
The Commission emphasized that the success of the office would depend on the overall 
design of the office.117 First, the office required consolidated audit and investigative functions, as  
well as sufficient staff and resources committed to the single responsibility of detecting fraud, 
waste, and abuse.118 Second, the office needed the power to inspect the books, accounts, and other 
documents necessary audit and investigate various agencies.119 Third, it also needed authorization 
to use legal processes when voluntary cooperation was withheld or when believed necessary to 
obtain evidence before it was lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable.120 Lastly, creating an 
apolitical body with broad jurisdiction would support effective prosecution of fraud and corruption 
in all areas of state procurement.121 
In addition to the goal of preventing and detecting fraud, waste, and abuse in the 
expenditure of public monies, a successful state inspector general's office equipped with the 
requisite abilities would provide added benefits to the overall function and efficiency of state 
government. Detecting and reducing fraud and waste in procurement would result in significantly 
lower costs to the government.122 Additionally, firms that wished to do business with the state 
would have a fairer and more hospitable playing field without rampant corruption.123 Lastly, the 
confidential nature of the office's proceedings would protect public officials, individuals, and 
                                                          
116 WARD COMM'N, Vol. III at 89-91.  
117 Id. at 90. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 91.  
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 91, 92. 
122 Id. at 90. 
123 Id. at 91. 
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business firms from unjust publicity or violations of privacy further promoting a fair and equitable 
business climate in Massachusetts.124 
C. KEY CHARACTERISTICS 
As a result of the Ward Commission's findings, the Massachusetts Legislature created the 
first state inspector general's office in the United States.125 Following most of the Commission's 
recommendations, the Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General is tasked with detecting and 
preventing fraud, waste, and abuse at all levels of government, reviewing programs and practices 
to identify vulnerabilities and areas for improvement, and providing guidance to public officials 
on public procurement and disposition of property and services.126 The success of the Inspector 
General in fulfilling its mission depends largely on its four main characteristics: Independence, 
subpoena power, referral capabilities, and confidentiality. 
First, the Inspector General's independence allows it to effectively investigate fraud, waste, 
and abuse in public agencies and programs, including those within the same branch of government. 
Although part of the organizational structure within the executive branch, the Inspector General 
may not be unilaterally removed from office by the governor.127 Instead, they may only be removed 
for cause by a majority vote of the attorney general, state auditor, and governor.128 The reasons for 
removal must be written and sent to the clerk of the senate, clerk of the house, and the governor, 
as well as be deemed a public document.129 Furthermore, the Inspector General is appointed by 
                                                          
124 Id. 
125 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, History of the Massachusetts OIG: Creation of the OIG, MASS.GOV; see 
also 1980 MASS. ACTS Ch. 388. 
126 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, §§ 7,8; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, Learn About the OIG: What We Do, 
MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/learn-about-the-oig (last visited Nov. 10, 2020).  
127 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 2. 
128 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 2; see also WARD COMM'N, Vol. III at 92. The Ward Commission recommended 
that the Inspector General only be removed for cause after a legislative hearing. 
129 Id.  
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majority vote of the governor and two constitutional officers whose responsibilities come closest 
to that of the Inspector General's Office, the attorney general and state auditor.130 
To further ensure independence, the Inspector General's Office is entirely apolitical. The 
Inspector General is statutorily required to be appointed without regard to political affiliation.131 
It must instead be selected solely on the basis of integrity and ability in accounting, auditing, 
financial analysis, law, management, and criminal justice administration.132 Further, the Inspector 
General has a five-year term so as not to coincide with the four year terms of the constitutional 
officers involved in the selection process.133 Moreover, officers and employees of the Inspector 
General's Office are prohibited from holding or running for elected office, holding any position in 
a political party or committee, or campaigning for any candidate for public office while employed 
or for three years after leaving the office.134 
Second, the Office of the Inspector General has broad authority to subpoena documents 
and testimony during the course of its investigations.135 As the role of the office is to police the 
Commonwealth in all areas of state procurement, the Inspector General has access to all records 
in state departments and agencies, with the exception of the legislature and Department of 
Veteran's Services,136 and the cooperation of all their officers and employees.137 The office also 
                                                          
130 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 2; WARD COMM'N, Vol. III at 92, 93. The Ward Commission recommended that, 
instead of the governor, the Secretary of Public Safety, being the executive branch representative responsible for law 
enforcement related activities, vote to appoint or remove the Inspector General. The Commission also recommended 
that to prevent a deadlock in the appointing process, the candidates for the position should be nominees selected by a 
majority vote of the deans of the seven Massachusetts law schools. The legislature opted not to include this 
provision.  
131 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 2. 
132 Id. 
133 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 2; WARD COMM'N, Vol. III at 92.  
134 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 4. 
135 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 15; 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.06, 1.07 (2004).  
136 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 9; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 18; 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.05(3)(a); see WARD 
COMM'N, Vol. III at 91, 92. The Ward Commission recommended that all agencies be subject to the Inspector 
General's access and disagreed with the legislature exempting themselves from investigation.  
137 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 9; 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.05(3). 
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has access to the records and testimony of private citizens, firms, or other entities including 
contractors.138 Moreover, the office may request the assistance of any public body in accessing 
records and testimony.139 If information or assistance is refused or withheld by employees within 
a particular agency, the Inspector General can solicit the direct assistance of the agency head or 
secretary.140 Furthermore, failure of public or private entities to create, keep, and produce records 
for inspection may lead to additional punishment.141 In requesting this information, the Inspector 
General must first seek voluntary production unless doing so would interfere with its 
investigation.142 
If the Inspector General is refused voluntary production of documents or testimony, or if 
doing so would interfere with its investigations, the office may issue summonses requiring such 
information.143 Unlike criminal summonses, the Inspector General need not prove probable cause 
that certain behavior has occurred.144 Instead, it must only show reason belief that individuals or 
agencies have information relevant to any matter under investigation or review.145 This subpoena 
power not only allows the office to conduct investigations into specific allegations of fraud or 
abuse, but also allows it to conduct audits and reviews of public agencies that may uncover 
wasteful practices or otherwise undetectable instances of corruption or fraud. Without this power, 
the Inspector General would be hindered from performing its duties as it would have to prove its 
case before conducting any investigation.146 Moreover, it could not perform useful audits or 
                                                          
138 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.05(4-5). 
139 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.05(3)(c). 
140 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.05(3)(e). 
141 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 39R; 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.05(4)(d). 
142 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.06(1)(g); see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 9, 15 (requiring a majority vote approval 
from the Inspector General Council). 
143 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 9; 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.06. 
144 See WARD COMM'N, Vol. III at 93.  
145 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 9, 15; 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.06(2)(a). 
146 See WARD COMM'N, Vol. III at 93. 
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reviews of agencies and would therefore fail in its duty to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and 
abuse. Therefore, the broad subpoena power is critical to the effective and dutiful performance of 
the Inspector General's responsibilities.  
Third, to promote the effectiveness of the prevention of fraud and corruption, the Inspector 
General has the power to refer its investigative or audit findings to the appropriate prosecutorial 
office.147 When the Inspector General has reason to believe that a person under investigation has 
engaged in criminal behavior, they may refer the relevant findings to the Attorney General of the 
Commonwealth or appropriate federal prosecutor.148 Furthermore, the office may refer its findings 
to the State Ethics Commission or to any other federal, state, or local agency with an interest in 
the findings.149 In addition, if a matter may lead to the recovery of public money on behalf of the 
Commonwealth, the Inspector General may refer the case to the Attorney General for a civil 
recovery action.150 
Additionally, the success of the Inspector General is aided and guided by collaboration 
with related state departments.151 The Inspector General Council serves as a consultant to the 
Inspector General and is available to assist the Inspector General in their audits and 
investigations.152 The Council is comprised of the Attorney General, State Auditor, Secretary of 
Public Safety and Security, State Comptroller, an attorney admitted to practice within 
Massachusetts, a citizen with experience in business or accounting or on the faculty of a college 
of business or accounting, and two members of the public.153 With required quarterly meetings 
                                                          
147 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 10; 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.09. 
148 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.09(1)(a). 
149 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.09(3)(a). 
150 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.09(2). 
151 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 3. 
152 Id.; see also WARD COMM'N, Vol. III at 91. The Ward Commission disagreed with the creation of the Inspector 
General Council as it would inject political partisanship into the offices controlling the Council. 
153 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 3. 
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with and available assistance from the Inspector General Council, the Inspector General is 
provided with additional expertise that allows it to carry out extensive, comprehensive 
investigations in the expenditure of public funds.  
Fourth, and finally, the statutorily required confidentiality of the Inspector General and its 
employees in their investigations and findings allows the office to remain independent in its duties, 
create a fair and equitable business environment, and encourage transparency and cooperation in 
the expenditure of public money.154 The confidentiality of the office precludes political 
motivations from interfering with its duties and ensures that the office cannot be used as a 
mechanism for retaliation against political opponents. Additionally, the public and business 
entities are protected from unjust publicity, thus maintaining a fair business environment reduced 
of bad actors.155 Moreover, confidentiality allows public agencies and businesses to cooperate with 
the Inspector General and commit themselves to proper and more efficient use of public money 
without fear of political damage or public retaliation.  
D. LIMITATIONS 
The Massachusetts Inspector General's Office largely benefits from its independence and 
apolitical nature in the exercise of its duties. Despite these key advantages, however, the Office's 
effectiveness is hindered in two ways: reliance on whistleblowers for reports of fraud and lack of 
final authority on investigatory findings. First, the Inspector General's Office relies upon 
anonymous whistleblower tips to initiate most of its investigations. Absent a whistleblower 
complaint, the Office is largely in the dark about instances of potential fraud or abuse. Without 
whistleblowers, the Office would be forced to conduct largescale audits of virtually all state 
funded programs. Lacking resources and funding to conduct such audits, whistleblowers are 
                                                          
154 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 13; see 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.14(1). 
155 See WARD COMM'N, Vol. III at 91. 
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essential to the operation of the Office. However, this reliance leaves the Office susceptible to 
vulnerabilities faced by whistleblowers, such as fear of loss of employment or confidentiality 
concerns, among others. In its most recent annual reports, the Office pushed for further 
whistleblower protections to ensure the abilities of the Office.156 
Second, though the Office produces the findings of its investigations to the respective 
agency and in its annual report, the agency in question is not required to follow the 
recommendations.157 Instead, the recommendations only provide the agency guidance to correct 
the action and methods to avoid future instances of wrongdoing. As such, it is not guaranteed the 
agency will take the action, though failure to do so will lead to heightened scrutiny of the 
agency. Moreover, it is only when there is a determination or suspicion of criminal activity that 
the Inspector General may report its findings to law enforcement agencies, such as the 
Massachusetts Attorney General or United States Attorney's Office.158 Thus, misuse of state 
funding or poor practices found in an agency will not stop or be fixed based upon the findings of 
the Inspector General alone. Outside pressures and good faith are necessary for corrective actions 
to actually occur.  
III. TRUMP'S REMOVALS & THE IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENCE 
A. INDEPENDENCE 
Inspectors general are mandated to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse through 
audits and investigations into public agencies and programs. The power of independence provides 
                                                          
156 See e.g. 2020 Annual Report at 54, Massachusetts Inspector General's Office, https://www.mass.gov/doc/office-
of-the-inspector-general-2020-annual-report/download.  
157 See 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.09.  
158 945 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.09(1). The Inspector General may also refer its findings to the Attorney General 
when there is belief the matter may be appropriate for a civil action to recover money for the Commonwealth. 
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essential accountability and transparency over government expenditures.159 Tasked with 
investigating and reporting misconduct in the very agency or branch under which they serve, the 
independence of inspectors general is so critical to their duties that statutory restrictions are in 
place to ensure their work cannot be politically motivated, nor can they be removed for political 
retaliations.160 Without this independence, inspectors general cannot conduct their work free from 
internal and external pressures which undermines their main purpose of government oversight. 
B. TRUMP'S FRIDAY NIGHT MASSACRES161 
Over the course of a month in the Spring of 2020, President Trump removed five inspectors 
general seemingly to undermine independent oversight of his administration and to retaliate 
against those he believes conspired against him in the first162 impeachment hearings or were 
otherwise disloyal.163 Raising further concern, President Trump named several political appointees 
to the inspector general vacancies, an apparent contradiction to the apolitical mandate of their 
selection.164 
                                                          
159 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Inspectors General: Independence Principles and Considerations for 
Reform, (June 8, 2020), at 1. 
160 See 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 3(a); 8G(c); 8G(e); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 2. 
161 See Aaron Blake, Trump's Slow-Motion Friday Night Massacre of Inspectors General, WASH. POST, May 18, 
2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/16/trumps-slow-moving-friday-night-massacre-inspectors-
general/. The Trump Administration announced the removals late on Friday nights, a period of low media 
interaction, typically known as a Friday-night news dump. Trump's removals have been likened to the Saturday 
Night Massacre, where President Nixon fired the special prosecutor of the Watergate investigation. 
162 President Trump was impeached twice. The first time in early 2020; the second in early 2021. 
163 See Blake, supra note 169; Philip Rucker, Karen DeYoung, Lisa Rein, and Hannah Knowles, Trump Ramps Up 
Retaliatory Purge with Firing of State Department Inspector General, WASH. POST, May 16, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-ramps-up-retaliatory-purge-with-firing-of-state-department-
inspector-general/2020/05/16/8f8b55da-979a-11ea-82b4-c8db161ff6e5_story.html; Liz Goodwin, Trump Wages a 
War on Watchdogs as Coronavirus Elevates Their Importance, BOS. GLOBE, May 7, 2020, 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/05/07/nation/trump-wages-war-watchdogs-coronavirus-elevates-their-
importance/. 
164 Liz Goodwin, BOS. GLOBE, May 7, 2020; see 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 3(a); 8G(c). 
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First, President Trump fired Steve Linick, Inspector General of the State Department, 
listing no specific reason other than that he lost confidence in Mr. Linick.165 Prior to his removal, 
Mr. Linick's office issued a report alleging leaders in the State Department mistreated and harassed 
staffer for being disloyal to President Trump.166 Further, Mr. Linick provided documents detailing 
allegations into Ukraine disinformation to the House's impeachment committee, and was allegedly 
investigating Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.167 President Trump nominated Stephen Akard, a 
former aide to Vice President Mike Pence, to the vacancy.168 
Second, President Trump fired the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 
Michael Atkinson, for "doing a terrible job."169 Mr. Atkinson famously forwarded the Ukraine 
whistleblower complaint that led to President Trump's first impeachment.170 Third, President 
Trump removed acting Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services Christi 
Grimm, after Ms. Grimm's office issued a report detailing severe shortages of equipment and 
procedures for coronavirus response.171 Fourth, acting Inspector General of the Department of 
Defense, Glenn Fine, was removed shortly after being named to oversee the Trump 
Administration's handling of a $2 trillion coronavirus stimulus package, with Trump citing 
                                                          
165 Jen Kirby, Trump's Purge of Inspectors General, Explained, VOX, May 28, 2020, 
https://www.vox.com/2020/5/28/21265799/inspectors-general-trump-linick-atkinson. 
166 Aaron Blake, Trump's Slow-Motion Friday Night Massacre of Inspectors General, WASH. POST, May 18, 2020. 
167 Id.; see Jen Kirby, Trump's Purge of Inspectors General, Explained, VOX, May 28, 2020. President Trump 
alleged that Secretary Pompeo urged him to fire Mr. Linick, saying "I don’t know him. Never heard of him. But I 
was asked by . . . Mike." 
168 Aaron Blake, supra note 163. 
169 Mary Clare Jalonick, Kevin Freking, and Deb Riechmann, Trump Suggests Firing Watchdog was Payback for 
Impeachment, YAHOO! NEWS, Apr. 3, 2020, https://news.yahoo.com/trump-fires-watchdog-handled-ukraine-
024044168.html?ncid=facebook_yahoonewsf_akfmevaatca. 
170 Aaron Blake, supra note 163. 
171 Id.  
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political bias.172 Fifth, President Trump replaced acting Inspector General of the Department of 
Transportation, Mitch Behm.173 
C. NEED FOR REFORM 
Although Congress cannot block the President from removing an inspector general, it can 
pressure the President in providing more detailed reasons for the removal.174 Tension between 
Presidents and inspectors general overseeing the executive branch is not new.175 However, 
President Trump's unilateral removals without detailed explanation are unprecedented.176 Such 
removals undermine the integrity and effectiveness of the inspectors general.  
Varying only slightly in their organization and functions177, federal inspectors general 
and the Massachusetts Inspector General differ in one important regard: Massachusetts' Inspector 
General may not be removed unilaterally, instead requiring a majority vote of the Attorney 
General, State Auditor, and the Governor.178 Thus, the executive – the governor – may not 
remove the Inspector General unilaterally. In contrast with the federal government, whose 
agency officials are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act,179 Massachusetts lacks an 
administrative procedure act or constitutional provision that grant executive removal power over 
agency officials.180 Accordingly, state agency officials are protected from unitary executive 
actions. Moreover, the Inspector General has greater freedom to act apolitically and provide 
                                                          
172 Id. Mr. Fine was replaced by a former White House Aide. 
173 Id. This removal was uncontroversial, but still troubling in the wake of the other four removals.  
174 Bill McCarthy, Trump Has Pushed Out 5 Inspectors General Since April. Here's Who They Are, POLITIFACT, 
May 19, 2020, https://www.politifact.com/article/2020/may/19/trump-has-pushed-out-5-inspectors-general-april-he/.  
175 Editorial Board, Stop the Purge of Inspectors General, BOS. GLOBE, May 18, 2020, 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/05/18/opinion/stop-purge-inspectors-general/.  
176 Aaron Blake, supra note 163.  
177 Not accounting for the organizational and Constitutional differences between the state and federal systems.  
178 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12A, § 2. 
179 See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).  
180 Executive Control of Agencies: State Executive Removal Power Over Agency Officials, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Executive_control_of_agencies:_State_executive_removal_power_over_agency_officials 
(last accessed May 5, 2021).  
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objective oversights of state agencies. Such a mechanism maintains the objectivity of the 
removal process and significantly reduces the likelihood of removal for political reasons. Thus, 
the governor cannot remove the inspector general for reasons akin to President Trump's.  
In response to President Trump's actions, the House introduced the Inspector General 
Independence Act which would allow the inspector general to be fired only for specified 
reasons.181 This requirement, however, can be manipulated, as Congress lacks the power to block 
a removal.182 Instead, the federal model of inspectors general could be modified to require a 
majority vote of the U.S. Attorney General, U.S. Auditor General, and the President. This 
removal method, however, likely implicates the Appointments Clause.183  
Alternatively, given the independent nature of inspectors general, the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Humphrey's Executor v. United States could provide a means for Congress to insulate the 
removal of inspectors general from the President's will.184 As with the Federal Trade Commission, 
the various inspectors general are intended to be impartial, apolitical, and quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative.185 Holding such an officer to continue at the will of the President would thwart 
Congress' intention that the office be independent and nonpartisan.186 Thus, another reform would 
be to require congressional approval by a majority vote of a specified committee for the removal 
                                                          
181 Danielle Haynes, House Democrats Seek Protections for Inspectors General, UPI, May 22, 2020, 
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2020/05/22/House-Democrats-seek-protections-for-inspectors-
general/4951590167718/. 
182 Seemingly, the President can fire an Inspector General for a political reason and doctor a report listing one of the 
specified reasons. 
183 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Whether federal inspectors general are "inferior" or "principal" officers is 
outside the scope of this paper. Similarly, whether and how the Appointments Clause is implicated is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
184 295 U.S. 602, 623 (1935). 
185 Id. at 623-24 ("But if the intention of Congress that no removal should be made during the specified term except 
for one or more of the enumerated causes were not clear upon the face of the statute . . . it would be made clear by a 
consideration of the character of the [office]"). Reviewing the FTC, the Court also considered the nature of the 
Commission's members being "called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts 'appointed by law 
and informed by experience.'" Id. (quoting Ill. Central R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 206 U.S. 441, 454 
(1907)). The Inspector General Act of 1978 has similar requirements.  
186 Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 624-26. 
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for cause of an inspector general. Indeed, Congress may limit the President's removal power as it 
deems best for public interest.187 A separate removal process would further insulate the inspector 
general from political motivations and fears and would increase the strength of its independence. 
Doing so would serve to increase government accountability and efficiency in the detection of 
fraud, waste, and abuse. A step that is necessary to restore public faith in government and promote 
future federal expenditures for programs that serve the people.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Inspectors general serve to provide transparency and accountability for the aim of 
strengthening public trust in the government. Without checks on independence, inspectors general 
are doomed to fail in their mission. The federal model ought to look to the states for reform ideas, 
so that actions like those of President Trump do not occur in the future. Of course, state and federal 
systems, though similar in organization, differ functionally under the Constitution. In a vacuum, 
the checks on removal of the Massachusetts Inspector General could translate to federal inspectors 
general, further insulating them from the political will of the President. This does not account, 
however, for the political and constitutional limitations faced by Congress. Nevertheless, to 
strengthen the independence of federal inspectors general from the will of the President, legislative 
changes to the Inspector General Act of 1978 should focus on the appointment and removal of the 
respective inspectors general.188 Though far from perfect, the successes of the Massachusetts 
Inspector General can largely be attributed to the independence of the office from the will of the 
Governor. The checks on removal provide the Inspector General assurance that its actions will not 
be motivated or affected by political considerations. Similar protections for federal inspectors 
                                                          
187 See Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 683 (2008) (quoting United States 
v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 483 (1886)).  
188 Any such change would likely only apply to federal entity inspectors general through Congress' powers under the 
Sweeping Clause, as establishment inspectors general are likely subject to the Appointments Clause. 
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general would strengthen the effectiveness of each office and prevent similar unilateral, politically-
motivated removals of inspectors general from reoccurring. 
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